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NOMENCLATURE
Pj    Input plaintext block of j = 64 bits
Cj    Output cipher text block of j = 64 bits
Ki    64-bit subkey for round i
⊕    Bitwise exclusive-OR operation
LCS(Pj,n)  Left circular shift by n bits
RCS(Pj,n)  Right circular  by n bits
||     Concatenation of two strings
!        Bitwise NOT operation 
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many lightweight ciphers have been 
introduced which have less footprint area, low power 
consumption and less gate counts. Lightweight ciphers like 
PRESENT1, PICCOLO2, TWINE3, SIMON and SPECK4 have 
the robust design and needs less than 2200 gate equivalents 
(GEs) for implementation. National security agency (NSA) 
launched the SIMON and SPECK ciphers which are considered 
to be the most ultra-lightweight ciphers. SIMON and SPECK 
has robust design and interesting key scheduling. We aimed at 
compact design and robust S-P network cipher which not only 
needs less footprint area but also take care of the other factors 
like power consumption, throughput and the attacks. PRESENT 
has the bit permutations as its P- layer which only requires 
wires for its hardware implementation1. Presented a cipher 
called PICO which is an SP network that needs less GEs, less 
footprint area and has low power consumption as compared to 
the PRESENT cipher and the other existing lightweight ciphers. 
Aimed at providing a strong substitution layer that makes the 
design robust. PICO shows good resistance against linear and 
differential attacks. PICO also shows good resistance against 
advance attacks like biclique attacks. 
Key scheduling algorithm makes a big impact on the GEs 
while designing the algorithm. The key scheduling of PICO 
cipher is motivated from SPECK cipher, which has compact 
key scheduling algorithm and it does not include the nonlinear 
layer in the design. So the GEs required to implement the PICO 
cipher are less as compared to the PRESENT Cipher.   
PICO cipher consumes only 28 mW of power, the power 
consumption evaluated with X-power analyser tool available 
in ISE design suit 14.2. Power is calculated with 10MHz 
frequency and on VIRTEX VI family.  
2. THE PICO BLOCK CIPHER
The design of PICO cipher is based on a substitution 
permutation network5. It has a total of 32 rounds. PICO cipher 
supports 64 bit plaintext and 128 bit key length. Figure 1 shows 
the block diagram of PICO cipher. 
Plaintext bits/cipher text bits are arranged in 4 X 16 
array format as shown in Fig. 2(a). Let P = p63||···||p1||p0 is the 
64 bit plaintext, row 0 contains the first 16 bits of plaintext 
p15||···||p1||p0, row 1 contains the next 16 bits p31||···||p17||p16, and 
so on, as shown in Fig. 2(a). Figure 2(b) represents the ‘Two-
dimensional Representation’ of 4 X 16 array. AddRoundkey, 
SubColumn and the Bit_Shuffle these three operations are 
involved to produce ciphertext. K32 is post whitening key.
Operations in PICO cipher are: 
PICO : An Ultra Lightweight and Low Power Encryption Design  
for Ubiquitous Computing
Gaurav Bansod*, Narayan Pisharoty, and Abhijit Patil
Electronics and Telecommunication, Symbiosis Institute of Technology, Pune - 412 115, India 
*Correspondence e-mail: gauravb@sitpune.edu.in
 ABSTRACT
An ultra-lightweight, a very compact block cipher ‘PICO’ is proposed. PICO is a substitution and permutation 
based network, which operates on a 64 bit plain text and supports a key length of 128 bits. It has a compact 
structure and requires 1877 GEs. Its innovative design helps to generate a large number of active S - boxes in fewer 
rounds which can thwart the linear and differential attacks on the cipher. PICO shows good performance on both 
the hardware and the software platforms. PICO consumes only 2504 bytes of Flash memory which is less than the 
ultra-lightweight cipher PRESENT. PICO has a very strong substitution layer (S-box) which not only makes the 
design robust but also introduces a great avalanche effect.  PICO has a strong and compact key scheduling which 
is motivated by the latest cipher SPECK designed by NSA. PICO consumes 28 mW of dynamic power which is 
less than the PRESENT cipher (38 mW). The security analysis of PICO and its performance as an ultra-lightweight 
cipher are presented. 
Keywords: Lightweight cryptography, SP network, block cipher, encryption, embedded security
Received : 23 September 2015, Revised : 11 February 2016 
Accepted : 22 March 2016, Online : 25 April 2016
RESEARCH PAPER
DEF. SCI. J., VOL. 66, NO. 3, MAy 2016, DOI : 10.14429/dsj.66.9276
260
2.1  Add_round_key 
Add_round_key performs an XOR operation with 64 bit 
current state output and 64 bit sub key. Where P → p63…..p0
P → P ⊕ Ki
2.2 SubColumn
The S-box used in PICO cipher is of 4×4 and illustrated in 
Table 1. Substitution operation performed column wise which 
was previously explained in RECTANGLE cipher6. 
2.3 Permutation_Layer
Permutation layer of PICO cipher is based on bit 
permutation. The bit permutation used in PICO cipher is 
depicted by Table 2. The bit pi,j present in ith row and jth column 
is shifted to the new bit position as shown in the Table 2. Bit_
Shuffle (p0,0) → p0,10. It means after permutation operation, the 
bit will be shifted to 0th row and 10th column. Because of the 
random nature of P box, it performs very well in customised 
hardware.
Pseudo code for PICO cipher is given as
P = P63 ...P0
RoundKeys()
for i = 0 to 31 do 
        Add_round_key (P, Ki)
   SubColumn (A)
	 	 Bit_Shuffle	(A)
End for
Add_round_key (A , K32)
C	→	A
2.4 Key Schedule of 128-bit Key Length
Key schedule of PICO cipher is motivated from the 
SPECK cipher key scheduling design4. SPECK key scheduling 
is compact in memory size requirement and no attacks till date 
are reported on it. 
In PICO cipher total 33 subkeys are used each of size 64 
bits  and these 64 bits are extracted from 128 bit key scheduling 
algorithm which is mentioned below.
(1) 128-bit key scheduling 
User defined 128 bit key is stored in the register Key, 
subkey K0 and L1 are represented as  
Key = k127 k126 k125…k2 k1 k0
Figure 1. Block diagram of PICO cipher.
Table 2.  P-box Of PICO Cipher
Figure 2. (a) 4 X 16 array format and (b) Two-dimensional 
representation of array.
Table 1.  S-box of PICO Cipher
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
S[x] 1 2 4 D 6 F B 8 A 5 E 3 9 C 7 0
j
i
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 0,10 1,5 1,12 2,6 2,12 3,0 3,11 0,1 3,3 0,15 2,9 0,2 3,12 2,2 1,8 1,4
1 3,8 0,6 1,1 1,15 2,4 3,5 0,12 2,14 1,14 3,4 0,11 0,4 1,7 2,3 2,8 3,15
2 0,8 2,7 0,3 2,11 3,9 3,1 1,0 1,9 2,5 2,10 3,13 3,2 0,0 0,9 1,2 1,10
3 3,10 3,7 0,7 1,3 1,13 0,14 2,15 2,0 2,1 0,5 3,14 2,13 0,13 3,6 1,6 1,11
SubColumn operation is based on the substituting S-box 
column wise. Operation of SubColumn is illustrated in Fig. 3. 
The input of a S-box is Column(i) = p3,i || p2,i || p1,i || p0,i where i 
ranges from 0≤  i ≤15 and p0,i is LSB bit and p3,i is the MSB bit 
of the 4 bit nibble.
Let P = p30p20p10p00 be the input to the S-box and Q = 
q03q02q01q00 is the output. For example, if P = 0000 then Q 
=0001.
Figure 3. Subcolumn operation.
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K0 = k63 k62…k1 k0 
L1 = k127 k126 …k66 k65 k64
After extracting key , K0 and L1 each of 64 bits, the subkeys 
K1 to K32 are  generated as follows
For j = 0 to 31 do
L264   = ((K
j
64) ⊕RCS(L
1
64,3)) ⊕(L
1
64);
Kj+164 = ((L
2
64) ⊕ LCS(K
j
64,7)) ⊕ j;
L164 = L
2
64;
End for
where LCS represents left circular shift by 7 bits and RCS 
represents right circular shift by 3 bits.
Subkeys are arranged in 4×16 array format as shown in 
Fig. 4 to perform AddRoundKey operation. 
CarDC = 2.
This is the most important property in designing of S-box. 
We have achieved Cardinality of 2 in both linear and differential 
table for the given S-box. This property indicates the strength 
and robustness of S-box. 
For any nonzero input mask 3. A ∈ F2
4 and output mask such 
that B ∈ F2
4 so we have LC (A, B) 
 LC (A, B) = # {a ∈ F2
4|A	•	a	=	B	•	S(a)}	-	8|	≤	4
For any nonzero input mask 4. A∈ F2
4 and output mask such 
that B ∈ F2
4, such that Hw(A) = Hw(B) = 1, we have
 SetLC = LC (A, B) = #{x ∈ F2
4|A	•	x	=	B	•	S(x)}	-	8|	≠	0
 Cardinality of SetLC can be given as CarLC, we have 
CarLC = 2.
Bijective i.e.5. 	S	(a)	≠	S(b) for all values of a ≠ b.
No static point i.e. 6. S	(a)	≠	a for all values of a ∈ F2
4.
Strength of the S-box depends on cardinality, For PICO 
cipher, S-box has CarDC = 2 and CarLC = 2.
In the case of PRESENT6 cipher, S-box has CarDC = 0 and 
CarLC = 8, while in case of RECTANGLE
6 cipher, S-box has 
CarDC = 2 and CarLC = 2.    
3.2 Linear Cryptanalysis
Liner Cryptanalysis10 is an attack which is applicable on 
the symmetric-key block ciphers. This attack is the known 
plaintext attack. High probability occurrences of linear 
expression containing plaintext bits, cipher text bits and subkey 
bits are used for mounting the linear attack on cipher. Linear 
attack is mounted by having the knowledge about a subset of 
plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext. An attacker tries 
to find the correlation between them. S-box is examined by 
forming linear approximation table (LAT). Bias (ε) can be 
given as |PL-1/2| where PL represents the linear probability. 
Maximum bias value for PICO cipher is 2-2. Optimising the 
bias in LAT and increase the number of active S-boxes in 
cipher structure provides robustness for the linear attack. 
PICO has minimum 11 active S-box for 6 rounds. By 
applying Matsui`s Pilling up Lemma10 total bias for 24 rounds 
is 2-45. The complexity of linear attack is 1/ (2-45) 2 = 290. Hence 
the complete rounds of PICO cipher shows good resistance 
against a linear attack.
3.3 Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis11,12 is an attack which is 
applicable to symmetric key block cipher. Differential 
cryptanalysis firstly applied on DES11. Pair of high probability 
input and output occurrences are used to mount this attack. 
Substitution layer is a nonlinear layer in design, which is 
examined by forming difference distribution table (DDT). PD 
represents differential probability, PD value for PICO S-box 
is 4/16 = 1/4 = 2-2. Minimize the differential probability (PD) 
and build a cipher design such that it maximises the minimum 
number of active S-boxes provide resistance against differential 
attack.
There are 12 active S-boxes for 6 rounds of PICO cipher. 
Differential probability for 24 rounds of the cipher is (2-2)48 = 
2-96. Total number of chosen plaintext required to mount this 
attack are 1/2-96 = 296. 
Figure 4. 4×16, 2-D representations of subkey bits.
3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PICO
Various cryptanalysis techniques are applied on a cipher 
to find the robustness of cipher. S-box is a nonlinear layer in 
cipher design and it plays a very important role to provide 
security against well-known attacks like linear attack and 
differential attack. 
Computer based techniques are used in this paper for 
selection of good S-box and to calculate the minimum number 
of active S-boxes.  
3.1 Design Criteria of the S-box
Gate count is increased by using separate S-box in each 
round of cipher and similarly it does not provide sensible amount 
of improvement in the resistance against known attacks7. We 
have chosen 4×4 S-box in our design of PICO cipher. S-box 
used in the PICO cipher is robust and prevents clustering of 
linear and differential trails. One of the most important aspect 
in PICO cipher design is the nonlinear robust layer S-box. 
4×4 S-box provides compactness and the selection of 
proper S-box provides resistance against linear and differential 
attack. We have considered these two parameters while 
designing the S-box. 
PICO S-box is S: F2
4 ← F2
4, it means that it takes a 4 bit 
input and produces a 4 bit output. Important properties for a 
good S-box design are mentioned which has been considered 
for the S-box selection.
Complete design criteria of the S-box which we have used 
in designing of the PICO cipher is given as follows, 
For any nonzero input difference 1. △A ∈ F2
4 and output 
differences △B ∈ F2
4 , respectively we have,
 DC (△A, △B) = # {a ∈ F2
4 |S (a) ⊕ S (a⊕△A) =△B}	≤	4
For any nonzero input differences 2. △A∈ F2
4 and output 
differences △B ∈ F2
4  such that Hw(△A) = Hw(△B) = 1, 
where Hw(x) denote Hamming weight of x, we have,
 SetDC = DC (△A, △B) = # {a ∈ F2
4 |S (a) ⊕ S (a⊕△A) 
=△B}	=	0
 Cardinality of SetDC can be given as CarDC, we have 
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3.4 Biclique Attack 
Biclique attack13,14 is an extension of meet-in-the-middle 
attack. We have applied 4-dimensional biclique cryptanalysis 
technique on PICO-128 for round 29 ∼ 32. 
For these rounds the partial keys used are (K29, K30, K31, 
K32). To construct the ∆i-differential we have considered 
sub keys (k30, k14, k62, k46) and for the ∇j-differential we have 
considered sub keys (k15, k33, k44, k27).
Since the ∆i-differential affects the 48 bits of the ciphertext 
as illustrated from Fig. 5. The data complexity does not exceed 
than 248. The total key recovery complexity of PICO-128 is 
Ctotal = 2
127.717.  
Figure 5.  4-D Biclique for PICO-128.
3.5 Algebraic Attack
Attacker applies the algebraic attack15 more usually on 
stream cipher rather than applying it on block cipher. The 4 × 
4 bit S-box is described by minimum 21 quadratic equations in 
the 8 input /output variables, Let x = a × 21 are the quadratic 
equations and in that y = a × 8 are the variables used to examine 
the complete cipher. Where a represents the number of S-boxes 
used in encryption algorithm and in key scheduling algorithm. 
For 32 rounds of cipher, there are a total 512 S-boxes in the 
encryption design. PICO cipher has the 10752 number of 
quadratic equations in 4096 variables, these many equations 
provides good resistance against the algebraic attack. 
3.6 Avalanche Effect16
When a single bit change in the input changes the output 
significantly, this results in an avalanche effect. For example 
by flipping a single bit in the input or in a key could change 
the half of the bits in cipher text. Cipher with good avalanche 
effect has higher probability to resist all possible types of 
attacks. The poor randomisation occurs when a block cipher 
does not show the avalanche effect to a significant degree. 
Table 3 shows some examples of avalanche effect. 
4. SECURITY COMPARISON WITH STANDARD 
ALGORITHM
In this section we have compared the security analysis 
of PICO with the other standard lightweight ciphers. The 
Table 3.  Avalanche effect for PICO-128
Plaintext 0000 0000 0000 0000 No. of bits change
Key
Ciphertext
00000000000000000000 
000000000000
fda7e7de58c913f4
--
Key
Ciphertext
0800000000000000 0000 
000000000000
72f4081fae46ef5d
40
Table 4.  Linear and differential attack comparison
Cipher name PICO PRESENT L-block FEW PICCOLO
#Rounds 24 25 15 27 30
# Active 
S-box from 
linear trails
45 50 32 45 30
# Active 
S-box from 
differential 
trails
48 50 32 45 30
#Known 
plaintext 290 2102 266 290 2120
#Chosen 
plaintext 296 2100 264 290 2120
Reference -- [1] [9] [19] [3]
Table 5.  Biclique attack comparison
Cipher 
name
Rounds Data 
complexity
Computational 
complexity
Reference
PICO-128 Full(32) 248 2127.717 This Paper
PRESENT-80 Full(31) 223 279.54 [13]
PRESENT-
128 Full(31)
219 2127.42 [13]
PICCOLO-80 Full(25) 248 279.13 [13]
PICCOLO-
128 Full(31)
224 2127.35 [13]
LED-64 Full(48) 264 263.58 [13]
LED-80 Full(48) 264 279.37 [13]
LED-96 Full(48) 264 295.37 [13]
LED-128 Full(48) 264 2127.37 [13]
comparison is represented in Table 4 and 5. Table 4 compares 
the linear complexity and differential complexity by considering 
the number of active S-boxes for the particular rounds.
Table 6 compares the S-box design considerations 
with the lightweight ciphers. PICO S-box has CARDC=2 and 
CARLC=2 which illustrate that PICO cipher S-box is robust 
in design and provides good security than other lightweight 
ciphers.
5. HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE 
PERFORMANCE OF PICO CIPHER
Design of a PICO cipher provides optimum performance in 
Table 5 compares the data complexity and computational 
complexity of PICO cipher with the other ciphers. 
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0.18 µ logic process (UMCL18G212T3)18. GEs calculation 
for PICO cipher is represented in Table 7.  For 128 bit key 
scheduling PICO cipher needs 1877 GEs.
Table 6.  S-box design consideration
Cipher name Max. Val. in DDT
Max. Val. 
in LAT CARDC CARLC
PICO 4 4 2 2
PRESENT 4 4 0 8
RECTANGLE 4 4 2 2
TWINE 4 4 5 7
hardware as well as on software platform. We have considered 
the 32 bit ARM 7 LPC2129 processor for analysing software 
performance of PICO cipher17. 
Footprint area, i.e. GEs are computed with standard 
cell library based on UMCL 180 0.18 µ logic process 
(UMCL18G212T3)18. Memory size required for PICO cipher 
on 32 bit processor is 2504 bytes as Flash memory and 1256 
as RAM memory. All other ciphers are written in embedded 
C and implemented on a 32 bit processor for comparison with 
the PICO cipher. Fig. 6 represents the memory comparison of 
the existing lightweight ciphers with PICO cipher. PICO needs 
less memory as compared to the other S-P network light weight 
ciphers. Datapath for the PICO cipher is shown in Fig. 7.
Area is computed with standard cell library UMCL 180 
Figure 7.  Data path for PICO cipher for 64-bit plaintext and 
128-bit key.  
Figure 8. Comparison on the basis of area17.
Table 7. Calculation of GEs for PICO Cipher
Data layer GEs Key layer GEs
D Reg. 384 K Reg. 768
S-Box 384 Shift Operator 0
P-Layer 0 S-box 0
XOR 170.88 XOR 170.88
Total 938.88 Total 938.88
Total number = 1877.76 =1878
Table 8. Power consumption of lightweight cipher
Standard cell Dynamic power consumption in mW
PICO        28
PRESENT        38
LED        100
RECTANGLE        31
Figure 6. Comparison on the basis of memory requirement.
ALGORITHMS
IN
 B
y
TE
S
ALGORITHMS
G
Es
We have calculated the power consumption by using 
X-power analyser tool available in ISE design suit 14.2. 
Power is calculated with 10 MHz frequency and on VIRTEX 
VI family. PICO Cipher consumes 28mW of power while 
PRESENT and RECTANGLE cipher consumes 38 mW and 31 
mW, respectively. PICO cipher consumes 26 per cent less power 
as compared to the PRESENT cipher. Power consumption 
mentioned in Table 8.
PICO results in consuming less GEs as compared to all 
the other existing lightweight cipher represented in Fig. 8.
Table 9 shows the comparison of lightweight ciphers with 
PICO based on parameters like execution time, throughput and 
number of cycles required to convert plain text to cipher text. 
Throughput is computed on a software platform at 12 MHz.
Test Vectors
Plain text:      0000 0000 0000 0000
Key:            0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
Cipher text:   fda7e7de58c913f4
Plain text:      0123 4567 89ab cdef
Key:            0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
Cipher text:   8ebcf6ffd7289163
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6. CONCLUSION
A PICO, an ultra-lightweight and low power cipher design 
is presented. PICO cipher design results in lesser foot print area 
and lower power consumption. PICO performs efficiently both 
on the hardware and the software platforms. The resistance of 
PICO cipher against well-known attacks as shown. PICO cipher 
has a very strong S-box and a robust permutation layer which 
prevents the cipher design from undergoing the clustering of 
linear and differential trails. In designing a PICO cipher, A 
small gate count as well as small power dissipation so that it 
can be implemented for security in any small scale embedded 
system is achieved. PICO needs less footprint area and less 
power consumption as compared to PRESENT, LED and 
other ciphers. For applications like RFID tags, Wireless sensor 
nodes, where small footprint area and power consumption play 
a crucial role, we believe the PICO cipher is one of the best 
suited designs. 
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